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THE STRIKE SUIT

I. Introduction
The problem of frivolous shareholder litigation against corporate
management has been a perennial target for commentators' analysis and
criticism. Practical experience and empirical studies have led courts
and commentators to conclude that in the United States, shareholder
litigation appears to be more open to abuse by strike suits' brought for
their mere nuisance and settlement value than other fields of civil
litigation.2
Traditionally, the debate over frivolous shareholder suits has
focused to a large extent on the shareholder derivative suit rather than
on direct shareholder actions.3 Once described by the U.S. Supreme
Court as the "chief regulator of corporate management," 4 the
shareholder derivative suit has repeatedly come under heavy attack for
its perceived ineffectiveness, for the burden it imposes on the
corporation's officials, and particularly for the risk of abuse it
contains. 5 This latter concern about the potential abuse of derivative
actions has led corporate officials and general counsels to argue in favor
of an outright abolition of the derivative suit. 6 The same concern has
led many courts and legislatures - the most current example being a

i. The term "strike suit," coined in the 1930s, refers to a derivative action whose nuisance
value gives it a settlement value independent of its merits. See Note, Extortionate Corporate
Litigation: The Strike Suit, 34 COLuM. L. REv. 1308 (1934).
2. See, e.g., Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741-43 (1975).
3. E.g., FRANKLIN S.
DERIVATIVE SUITS (1944).

WOOD,

SURVEY

AND

REPORT

REGARDING

STOCKHOLDERS'

4. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949).
5. For an early and very influential critical study that has led to the enactment of securityfor-expenses statutes in many states, see WOOD, supra note 3. For more recent criticism see
Richard W. Duesenberg, The Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder Derivative Suits: A View
From the Inside, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 311, 331-35 (1982); Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit:
Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 84-85 (1991) [hereinafter Romano,
Litigation Without Foundation].
6. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in
Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAw & CONTEMI,. PROBS. 5, 49 (Summer 1985) [hereinafter Coffee,
Unfaithful Champion]; Barbara Franklin, Business Council Wages War On Derivative Suits,
N.Y.L.J. July 8, 1993, at 5.
But the derivative suit has also many advocates. One of them has put his position into the
following terms: "The strike suit ... may very well be no more than an over-the-hill dragon,
puffed into life to frighten the courts away from deciding substantive issues." WILLIAM L. CARY
& MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 931 (6th ed. 1988). The
derivative suit has likewise been endorsed by the American Law Institute as an important means
of protection for shareholders against managerial misconduct. A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE:

ANALYSIS

AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

587-88 (Proposed Final Draft

[hereinafter AlI, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE].

1992)
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1993 draft proposal for New York7 - to discuss and implement
various procedural hurdles which shareholder plaintiffs must overcome
before they can bring derivative actions.8
Recent research has revealed, however, that with the increasing
occurrence of federal securities litigation, similar problems of abusive
and frivolous litigation have developed in the field of securities class
actions, including class actions brought by shareholder plaintiffs against
corporate officials.9 This suggests that both private enforcement
mechanisms - the derivative suit and the shareholder class action suffer from apparently similar kinds of defects that create incentives for
frivolous suits and abuse. This, in turn, means that an analysis of thephenomenon of shareholder strike suits has to comprise both the
derivative suit and the shareholder class action.
This article has two purposes: (1) to argue against the abolition of
the derivative suit and (2) to discuss the incentives for abuse created by
both derivative suits and class actions and potential methods of
redressing these problems. Part II of the article will argue against the
demands for a complete abolition of the derivative suit as a means to
solve the problem of frivolous shareholder litigation. It will show how
deft plaintiffs can avoid the procedural restrictions that have been
imposed on derivative litigation in order to prevent strike suits by
casting their claims in terms of direct shareholder actions. The
argument is that the more it is possible to bypass the limitations of
derivative suits by direct class actions, the less sense it makes to call for

7. The draft proposal was introduced in 1993 into the New York State Legislature and has
been the object of a major lobbying effort by the Business Council of New York State. See
Barbara Franklin, supra note 5. This draft proposal will be analyzed in greater detail infra in the
text accompanying notes 105-10 and 123-28.
8. These procedural restrictions will again be discussed at a later point in this text. Only
the three most important will be briefly mentioned here. First of all, as a general rule in virtually
all United States jurisdictions, before bringing a derivative suit against corporate officials, a
shareholder must first make a demand on the corporation's board of directors to act in order to
remedy the situation about which the shareholder complains. ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAW
640 (1986). Secondly, a majority of jurisdictions has the contemporaneous ownership rule,
requiring that the plaintiff either was a shareholder at the time of the transaction complained about
or received the shares thereafter by operation of law. Id. at 650. Finally, about one third of the
states have statutes under which a plaintiff bringing a derivative suit may be required to post
security for the defendants' litigation expenses. Id. at 652. For more details see infra notes 60-72
and accompanying text.
9. See Romano, Litigation without Foundation, supra note 5, at 55; John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Understanding the Plaintifs Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private
Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986)
[hereinafter Coffee, Understanding the Plaintifs Attorney]; Thomas Jones; An Empirical
Examination of the Resolution of Shareholder Derivative and Class Action Lawsuits, 60 B. U. L.
REV. 542 (1980) [hereinafter Jones, Resolution of Shareholder Lawsuits].
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abolishing the derivative suit and the more it becomes necessary to
concentrate on the common features of derivative and direct class
actions in order to tackle the problem of frivolous litigation. In Part III,
the article will analyze the common mechanisms of derivative suits and
shareholder class actions that appear to create incentives for their abuse
by unscrupulous plaintiffs. It will further discuss various means to
redress these problems.
II. Is the Distinction Between Direct Actions and Derivative Suits
Useful for Solving the Problem of the Shareholder Strike Suit?
Before describing the extent to which derivative suits and direct
shareholder actions may be directly or indirectly "interchangeable," a
brief overview will be given of the criteria generally used by the courts
to distinguish between these two kinds of actions.
A. Criteriafor Distinction Between Direct and Derivative
Shareholder Actions
Courts and commentators employ a variety of rubrics in
determining whether a particular action should be brought as a direct or
as a derivative action.' ° The most commonly used approach is to
determine the impact of the monetary injury alleged in the complaint by
asking whether the injury was suffered directly by the corporation, and
thus by the stockowners only through the diminution of the value of
their shares, or whether the injury was done primarily to the
shareholders as such." A different approach places the emphasis on
the nature of the right or duty the shareholder seeks to enforce rather
than on the economic impact.'" In essence, it asks whether it is- a right
of the individual shareholder or a duty towards the corporation as a
whole that has allegedly been violated.' 3 A third method which is
used by some courts and commentators follows a categorical approach
that essentially relies on stare decisis and considers certain actions as
being, by definition, either derivative or direct.'4

10. See John W. Welch, Shareholder Individual and Derivative Actions: Underlying
Rationales and the Closely Held Corporation,9 J. CORP. L. 147, 153 (1984).
11. DEBORAH DEMoT-r, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: LAw AND PRACTICE, § 2:01
(1992); CLARK, supra note 8, at 662, 663.
12. See ALI, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 6, at 604; Welch, supra
note 10, at 160-61.
13. ALl, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 6, at 604; Welch, supra note
10, at 160-61.
14. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 8, at 662-63; Welch, supra note 10, at 157.
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In spite of the variety of criteria, surprisingly little inconsistency
in result has occurred. '" Therefore, whatever the approach, there is a
general agreement upon the characterization of certain kinds of actions.
Suits based on breaches of-the directors' fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty under state law, such as suits based on grossly negligent
mismanagement, waste of corporate assets, excessive compensation,
usurpation of corporate opportunity, and on general self-dealing, are
actionable only as derivate suits. 6 On the, other hand, suits for the
deprivation of shareholders' voting rights, 7 preemptive rights, 8 or
rights to inspect the corporation's books and records,' 9 suits to compel
the declaration of dividends,20 and suits alleging that the
directors/officers fraudulently induced the shareholder to sell stock,2'
are generally treated as direct actions.
B. Ways to Avoid the Procedural Hurdles for Derivative Suits by
Bringing a Direct Action
Despite this rather clear-cut distinction between derivative and
direct actions, there exist a number of situations in which the
shareholder plaintiff can, by deft pleading, cause the court to classify
the action as direct rather than derivative, thereby avoiding the
procedural restrictions of the derivative suit. To illustrate what is meant
by this statement, the following analysis will focus on the extent to
which shareholder plaintiffs can cast claims concerning alleged
violations of the corporate official's duty of loyalty towards the
corporation in different terms so that they can sue the corporate official
directly. First, this section will ask whether the shareholder plaintiff
can do this by basing its claim on the alleged infringement of
shareholder rights as they arise under state law. Then it will analyze
the extent to which the same can be done by suing for a violation of
federal securities law.
1. Suit for Violation of Shareholder Rights or Directors' Duties
Arising under State Law.-A recurring fact pattern in which shareholder
plaintiffs can use direct actions to attack a wrongdoing by a corporate
official or controlling shareholder that is essentially a violation of the

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Welch, supra note 10, at 158-59; DEMoTT, supra note 11, at § 2:01.
CLARK, supra note 8, at 663; Welch, supra note 10, at 157.
See Eisenberg v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 451 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1971).
See Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum Corp., 99 A.2d 236 (Del. Ch. 1953).
See Leisner v. Kent Inv., Inc., 307 N.Y.S.2d 293 (1970).
See Knapp v. Bankers Sec. Corp., 230 F.2d 717 (3d Cir. 1956).
See Siegel v. Engelmann, 143 N.Y.S.2d 193 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
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duty of loyalty is where the shareholders can show that they have also
been injured personally by an infringement of their stock's voting
prerogatives. An often cited example of this scenario is Reifsnyder v.
Pittsburgh Outdoor Advertising Co. 22 In Reifsnyder, a minority
shareholder brought suit attacking a transaction in which Pittsburgh
Outdoor Advertising, after. approval by a majority of its shareholders,
had repurchased all of its shares owned by General, its largest and
majority shareholder, and had increased its indebtedness to finance the
purchase. 23
The plaintiff claimed that:
(a) the purchase was
accomplished only by the vote of General, acting as shareholder, and
General's shares were not entitled to vote on the resolution because of
its self-interest; and (b) the price Pittsburgh paid for General's shares
was excessive.24 In essence, Reifsnyder's claim may be regarded as
charging a violation of the duty of loyalty by an act of self-dealing.
The court, however, held that the suit was direct and not derivative.25
It said that if the complaint had been limited to the excessiveness of the
price, the action might have to be deemed derivative. 26 But, since the
gravamen of the complaint concerned the dilution of the suing
shareholder's votes by the participation of the interested majority
shareholder in the voting, and since the right to vote is independent of
any right that the corporation possesses, Reifsnyder was entitled to
bring a direct action. 27 Thus, the plaintiff was relieved from having
to obey the otherwise applicable security-for-expenses statute of the
forum.2"
Similar problems have arisen in various cases involving defensive
maneuvers against hostile takeover attempts. In these cases, the courts
have dealt repeatedly with the question of whether the issuance of a
"poison pill" security can be challenged by a direct rather than a
derivative action on the grounds that it restricts the voting rights or the
alienability of the suing shareholder's stock.29 For example, in Lipton

22. 173 A.2d 319 (Pa. 1961).
23. Id.at 320.
24. Id.at 320-21.
25. Id.at 322.
26. Id. at 321.
27. Reifsnyder, 173 A.2d at 321. See also the similar case of Eisenberg v. Flying Tiger Line,
Inc., 451 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1971) where the plaintiff sued in order to undo a corporate
reorganization and merger that allegedly was meant to deprive him as minority shareholder of any
vote in the newly spawned company. The court held that the suit was direct and that, therefore,
New York's security-for-expense requirement was not applicable. Id. at 271.
28. Eisenberg, 451 F.2d at 271.
29. See, e.g., Lipton v. News Int'l, PLC, 514 A.2d 1075 (Del. 1986); Moran v. Household
Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059 (Del. Ch. 1985), affd on other grounds, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985);
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v. News International, PLC, two shareholders of Warner
Communications attempted to vacate a stipulation of dismissal in an
action against Warner by News Intemational, PLC.30
News
International had acquired a 7% interest in Warner, thereby making it
Warner's largest shareholder.3
Apparently in response to News's
increased holdings, Warner had finalized an exchange agreement with
a third company, Chris-Craft Industries, pursuant to which Warner
would exchange a 19% interest in its stock for a stock interest in ChrisCraft.32
Because Warner had an 80% supermajority voting
requirement for certain shareholder actions, including the removal of
directors, this 19% interest, if combined with those shares controlled by
Warner's management, would have given Warner's management, acting
in cooperation with Chris-Craft, a veto power over any change in the
composition of Warner's board.33 In response to this agreement, News
instituted an action alleging that the agreement deprived News of its
voting rights, wasted corporate assets, and was designed to entrench
management.34
Two months later, the parties resolved their
differences and filed a stipulation for dismissal. 35 The parties made
no attempt to comply with the notice and court approval requirements
for derivative suits. 36 Then, two other Warner shareholders intervened
and tried to vacate the stipulation of dismissal by contending that the
action by News was derivative in nature, and that therefore the
stipulation of dismissal was improper because the parties had failed to
comply with the notice and court approval requirements. 37 The court
held that these allegations supported direct as well as derivative causes
of action,38 stating that "[a] shareholder who suffers an injury peculiar
to itself should be able to maintain an individual action, even though the

Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 230 A.2d 769 (Del. Ch. 1967).
30. Lipton, 514 A.2d at 1076.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1076-77.
35. Lipton, 514 A.2d at 1077.
36. According to FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 and similar rules in many state jurisdictions, a
derivative action shall not be dismissed or settled without approval of the court, and notice of the
proposed settlement or dismissal must be given to the shareholders in the manner the court directs.
See CLARK, supra note 8, at 657.
37. Lipton, 514 A.2d at 1075-77.

38. Id. at 1078. With respect to the direct cause of action the court specifically stressed the
fact that News was allegedly injured in its voting rights because the exchange agreement had
secured for the Warner management the veto power over all shareholder actions. Id. at 1079. But
see Moran, 490 A.2d at 1070-71, where the same court held in a similar situation that the action

was only derivative in nature.
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corporation also suffers an injury from the same wrong." 39 But it then
held that News, by not making any effort at all to comply with the
demand-on-the-board requirement of Delaware Chancery Court Rule
23.1, had proceeded with its suit only individually and not on behalf of
the Warner corporation as a whole.4" Thus, the court held that the
prior action had been direct rather than derivative.
In both Reifsnyder and Lipton, the shareholder plaintiffs wanted to
attack transactions that essentially constituted acts of unfair self-dealing
by the corporate officials or the controlling shareholder. At the same
time, the plaintiffs were able to claim that these transactions violated
the voting prerogatives of their stock so that their claims could be
characterized as both direct and derivative. It was in the plaintiffs'
interest to avoid the procedural restrictions imposed on derivative suits
(i.e., the security-for-expenses, notice-of-shareholders, and courtapproval requirements) by having their claims treated as pure direct
actions. They succeeded in their efforts by either placing the emphasis
of their complaints on the causes of action that supported direct
shareholder suit or by openly disobeying the special procedural
requirements for derivative suits. Although the courts apparently
41
realized the true purpose of these pleading and litigation strategies,
they were still willing to hold that the suits were direct actions.
2. Suit for Violation of Shareholder Rights of Directors' Duties
Arising under Federal Securities Law.-Another way for the
shareholder plaintiff to attack what is essentially a duty of loyalty
violation by a corporate official by means of a direct action may be to
base the claim on an alleged violation of federal securities law.
(a) Section 14(a) liability in proxy solicitation context for
misrepresentation or non-disclosure.--One way to do this is to claim

39. Lipton, 514 A.2d at 1079.
40. Id. The court noted, however, that this strategy cannot create an individual action where
the complaint does not support one and that it is only an indication that the plaintiff is pursuing
individual, and not derivative, claims. Id. at 1079-80.
41. Note in this respect the remarks of Justice Moore, concurring in Lipton:
Because of their apparent pragmatic result, both the majority opinion and that of the
trial court may be interpreted as sanctioning one rule for the large shareholder litigant,
who by guile and artful pleading gives the impression of championing the rights of all
stockholders without any such intention, while the small stockholder is firmly held to
the strictures of Chancery Rule 23.1 .... In its pleadings, other filings, and the public
statements of its chairman and managing director, Mr. K. Rupert Murdoch, News
clearly conveyed the message that it was bringing this action to vindicate the rights of
all Warner shareholders, and to protect Warner as a corporate entity.
Id. at 1081.
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that the corporate official has, by a self-dealing transaction, violated not
only his fiduciary duties towards the corporation, but also the proxy
disclosure requirements existing under federal securities law. 42 It may
very well be that the respective self-dealing transaction is one that
requires shareholder approval. In that case, it may happen either that
the corporate official expressly misrepresents material facts concerning
the transaction in the proxy statement, thereby violating Section 14(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act 43 and Rule 14a-9" promulgated
thereunder, or that the corporate official fails to disclose in the proxy
solicitation his conflicts of interests in that self-dealing transaction.
However, non-disclosure of a conflict of interest in a proxy
solicitation constitutes a violation of Section 14(a) only if the corporate
official is under an affirmative duty to reveal the self-dealing in the
proxy solicitation.4" Such a duty of disclosure may in fact exist under
the specific proxy disclosure requirements as promulgated by the SEC
under Section 14(a).46 For example, Rule 14a-3 provides that no
solicitation of proxies that is subject to the proxy rules shall be made
unless the person being solicited "is concurrently furnished or has
previously been furnished with a written proxy statement containing the
'
information specified in Schedule 14A."47
Schedule 14A, in turn, lists
in detail the information that must be furnished when specified types of
transactions are to be acted upon by the shareholders. 48 For example,
as to any matter to be acted upon by the shareholders other than the
election to office, Item 5 requires disclosure of any substantial interest
by the company's directors and executive officers in the respective
transaction. 49 Since Rule 14a-3 and Schedule 14A are backed up by
the above-mentioned Rule 14a-9, failure to fulfill these specific
disclosure requirements would constitute a violation of Rule 14a-9 and
Section 14(a)."0

42.

See generally MARc I. STEINBERG, SECuRITIEs REGULATION: LIABILITIES AND REMEDIES

§ 1.03 (1992) for a discussion of corporate officials' liability for nondisclosure of self-dealing
under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982).
44. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1990). Rule 14a-9 provides that no solicitation of proxies subject
to the proxy rules shall contain any statement that is false or misleading with respect to any

material fact or that omits a material fact.
45. See generally STEINBERG, supra note 42, at § 1.03.
46. STEINBERG, supra note 42, at § 1.03[1]; cf SEC v. Kalvex, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 310
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
47. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1990).
48. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1990).
49. Id.
50. See United States v. Fields, 592 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917

THE STRIKE SUIT

Consequently, the SEC regulatory law under Section 14(a) offers
shareholders of reporting companies the opportunity to attack selfdealing by directors "indirectly" under federal law if they succeed in
arguing that the directors, when asking for the shareholders' approval
of a transaction, have misrepresented material facts or have violated
their duties to disclose their interests in the transaction in the proxy
statement. Misled shareholders have a private right of action against
the corporate officials for violation of Section 14(a) and of Rule 14a9."S They may bring the private action as either a derivative or a
direct suit, with the courts not always being precise about which form
is the right one. 2 For example, in J. . Case Co. v. Borak, the U.S.
Supreme Court apparently chose the "injury" approach53 to determine
the nature of the action, seeming to assume that an action brought for
proxy rules violations should generally be treated as a derivative suit
since "the injury which a stockholder suffers from corporate action
pursuant to a deceptive proxy solicitation ordinarily flows from the
damage done the corporation, rather than from the damage inflicted
directly upon the stockholder." 4
However, under the "rights"
55
approach used by many courts for distinguishing between direct and
derivative suits, it would seem more appropriate to characterize a
shareholder suit brought under Section 14(a) as a direct action. After
all, it is generally recognized that the proxy rules have been adopted for
the special benefit of the shareholders because it is they who may be
recipients and victims of misleading proxy statements.56
(b) Rule JOb-5 liability for self-dealing.i Another important
vehicle for bringing an action under federal securities law, even though
the claim essentially concerns a violation of fiduciary duties as arising
under state law, is to put the complaint in the terms of a Rule lOb-5
claim of non-disclosure or misstatement. In this respect, a whole line
of cases has developed 7 that consider certain misconduct of corporate

(1979).
51. J. 1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
52. See id.
53. See supra text accompanying note 10.
54. J . Case Co., 377 U.S. at 432. However, the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Mills
v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) seems to suggest that if the transaction that needed
shareholder approval was a merger agreement and if the merger resulted in a reduction of the
earnings of their holdings, the shareholders may be entitled to recover damages directly (i.e., under
a direct suit).
55. See supra text accompanying note 11.
56. See RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 1096 (7th ed. 1992).
57. This case law has continued to develop even after the U.S. Supreme Court decided Santa
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officials and controlling shareholders actionable under Section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act, 8 and Rule 1Ob-5 5 9 thereunder, when
this conduct causes the corporation to enter into a securities transaction
that is adverse to the corporation's interest. 6" Generally in these cases,
the minority shareholders, as repositors of the corporation's capacity to
be deceived, 6' sue the corporate officials and/or the controlling
shareholders for failing to disclose that the terms of the sale or purchase
of securities which they caused the corporation to transact were unfair
to the corporation. 62
A suit brought for alleged self-dealing in connection with the sale
or purchase of securities under Rule 1Ob-5 is, however, more often than
not a derivative action rather than a direct action.63 In the usual fact
pattern, the claim is that the defendants have primarily deceived and
injured the corporation so that the shareholder plaintiffs have suffered
monetary losses only indirectly through the diminution of their shares'
value. 64 Therefore, putting a suit for self-dealing into the terms of a
Rule I Ob-5 action does not change the suit from a derivative to a direct
one. However, it still enables the shareholder plaintiff to gain some
procedural advantages as compared to a derivative action under state
law.65 Most important in this context is that in McClure v. Borne

Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), which at first seemed to severely undercut
previous circuit court decisions like Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969), that had opened the way for mismanagement and self-dealing suits
under Rule I Ob-5. In Santd Fe Industries, the majority opinion expressly relegated all shareholder
suits complaining about corporate mismanagement or self-dealing to state law and to the state
courts. Santa Fe Industries, 430 U.S. at 479. But perhaps the Supreme Court Justices
underestimated the ingenuity of the circuit courts and their determination to salvage the holdings
in their previous cases. For an extensive survey of the case law following Santa Fe Industries,
see James F. Jorden & Michael T. Greif, FederalSecurities FraudAnd State Law FiduciaryDuties
- A Tour of the Circuits Reveals ContinuingConfusion, 19 IDAHO L. REv. 211 (1983). See also
JENNINGS, supra note 56, at 1046-55.
58. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
59. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990).
60. Kidwell ex rel. Penfold v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979); Wright v. Heizer Corp.,
560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d
209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978); Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 215; see also
Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1979).
61. See Note: Suits for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Under Rule lOb-5 After Santa Fe
Industries, Inc. v. Green, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1874, 1882 (1978).
62. See, e.g., Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 220; Goldberg, 567 F.2d at 215-18.
63. See JENNINGS, supra note 56, at 1046-47.
64. Cf Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 215; Goldberg, 567 F.2d at 209.
65. For further details, see JENNINGS, supra note 56, at 1046-47. It is important to note,
though, that at least since Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., I II S. Ct. 1711 (1991), the
question of whether a derivative shareholder action under federal securities law is subject to the
demand-on-the-board requirement is governed by the law of the state of incorporation rather than
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Chemical Co.66 it was held that a derivative action brought under the
1934 Act is not subject to the state securities-for-expenses statutes
which are usually applicable to derivative suits.
3. Summary.-The preceding analysis demonstrates that a skillful
plaintiff may find various ways to use a direct shareholder action to
attack the violation of fiduciary duties by a corporate official, despite
the fact that such wrongdoing is generally considered to be actionable
only by means of a derivative suit. Although alleged violations of the
corporate officials' duty of loyalty by self-dealing are one of the central
points of dispute in derivative shareholder litigation, it has been shown
that in certain circumstances these self-dealing transactions may be
subject to attack by a direct action. This is possible either because the
same transaction has infringed shareholder voting rights or because the
potential conflicts of interest of the corporate officials have not been
disclosed in proxy solicitations seeking shareholder approval of the
respective transaction, contrary to the SEC disclosure requirements.
This result is important for the subject of the following section that
deals with the potential abuse of shareholder litigation. If it is possible
to avoid the procedural restrictions imposed today on shareholder
derivative suits by enforcing the fiduciary duties of corporate officials
by means of a direct action, then it makes no real sense to simply
demand the outright abolition of the legal instrument called the
"derivative suit." Rather, one should focus on the various aspects of the
procedural law that may in fact create incentives for the abuse of this
instrument. Since the same kind of problems also exist in direct
0

by federal law. Although Kamen v. Kemper actually concerned a derivative action brought under
the Investment Company Act of 1940, its general reasoning appears to be applicable to a derivative
suit under federal securities law as well. Before this case, the Supreme Court had held in Burks
v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979), that a federal court should apply state, not federal, law to
determine whether the disinterested directors of an investment company had the authority to
discontinue a derivative action alleging violations of the Investment Company and Investment
Advisers Acts, unless the court found the respective state law rule inconsistent with the policy of
those federal acts. Id. at 479. The Supreme Court in that case strongly intimated that it found no
such inconsistency. Id. at 483-85. Two subsequent lower court decisions have since held that it
is not inconsistent with the policies of Sections 10(b) and 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act to
authorize disinterested directors to discontinue derivative actions alleging violations of those
sections. Abramowitz v. Posner, 672 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1982); Maldonado v. Flynn, 671 F.2d
729 (2d Cir. 1982).
66. 292 F.2d 824 (3rd Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961); accord, Epstein v.
Solitron Devices, Inc., 388 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1968). For more details about the security-forexpenses statutes, see infra notes 84-90 and accompanying text. The plaintiff can also profit from
nationwide service of process and the ability to bring the action under Rule lOb-5 anywhere where
any part of the transaction complained of occurred. See Section 27 of the Securities Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.
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shareholder actions brought in the form of class actions, the following
analysis of the problems of abuse of shareholder litigation and the ways
to counter it will cover both shareholder class actions and derivative
suits.
III. Frivolous Litigation in Shareholder Class Actions and Derivative
Suits: Common Problems and Solutions
A. Overview
As noted at the beginning of this article, practical experience and
empirical studies have led courts and commentators to conclude that in
the United States, shareholder litigation appears to be more open to
abuse by frivolous suits than other fields of private litigation.
Traditionally, only the shareholder derivative suit was blamed in this
respect.67 However, more recent research has revealed that with the
increasing occurrence of federal securities litigation, similar problems
seem to have developed in the field of securities class actions.6 8
Several incidences are regularly cited in this context as indicating the
existence of incentives to abuse the system of shareholder litigation for
purposes other than for the enforcement of corporate officials' legal
duties. There is empirical evidence that the settlement rate appears to
be higher in shareholder derivative suits and class actions than in other
fields of civil litigation,69 that a substantial number of claims are

67. See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 3; Note, Extortionate CorporateLitigation: The Strike Suit,
supra note 1.
68. See Romano, Litigation Without Foundation, supra note 5; Coffee, Understanding the
Plaintifs Attorney, supra note 9; Jones, Resolution of Shareholder Lawsuits, supra note 9.
69. One author cites evidence that in general civil litigation the settlement rate is likely to
be around 60 to 70 percent, whereas in a small sample of a group of very similar securities class
actions involving initial public offerings of new computer companies in the year 1983, 100 percent
of the cases that were resolved did so by settlement. Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits
Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 525-26 (1991).
These and other findings of Alexander's study have been disputed, however, by litigators who
claim that her sample of only 20 cases was too small, too skewed, or that the context of initial
public offerings is unique because of the severe liability imposed on the issuer and the other
defendants by Section 11 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The
"New Learning" on Securities Litigation,N.Y.L.J., March 25, 1993, at 5 [hereinafter Coffee, New
Learning].
Another study of 54 class and derivative sectrities actions filed in federal district courts in
Dallas from January 1, 1966 to June 30, 1973 showed that 83 percent were disposed of by
settlement. John E. Kennedy, Securities Class and Derivative Actions in the United States District
Courtfor the Northern District of Texas: An Empirical Study, 14 HOus. L. REv. 769, 811 (1977).
However, a third study based on all shareholder suits brought from the late 1960s through 1987
against a sample of 535 public corporations mentions that of the 128 cases that were resolved, only
65 percent settled. Romano, Litigation Without Foundation, supra note 5, at 58, 60.
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settled in terms that offer the plaintiff shareholders only nonpecuniary
relief but award their attorneys substantial legal fees, 70 and that of
those few cases adjudicated by final judgment, only a small fraction is
decided in favor of the suing shareholders.
The conclusions generally drawn from these and other empirical
data are twofold. On the one hand, it appears that a relatively high
number of these shareholder class actions and derivative suits may be
without merit and that the real driving force behind these suits are not
the shareholders, but their attorneys for whom powerful incentives seem
to exist to bring nonmeritorious actions for their nuisance and settlement
value.72 On the other hand, commentators conclude that even in
meritorious cases, there are strong incentives for plaintiffs' lawyers to
reach an inadequate or even collusive settlement with defendants that
exchanges a low recovery for plaintiffs for a high award of attorneys'
fees, thus indicating the existence of substantial conflicts of interest
between the plaintiffs' attorneys and their clients.7 3
The debate as to what creates these incentives and how to remedy
these problems usually distinguishes between two different stages of the
shareholder litigation that seem to be critical in this respect: the pretrial

70. According to Romano, Litigation Without Foundation, supra note 5, at 61, only a little
over half of the settlements (46 of 83) involved any monetary recovery, yet the vast majority (75
of 83) involved fee awards to the plaintiffs' attorneys. In 21 suits the settlement involved only
structural relief instead of a financial recovery, and in seven cases the only relief was attorneys'
fees. Id.
71. Romano, Litigation Without Foundation, supra note 5, at 60, notes that in the analyzed
case sample shareholder plaintiffs had "abysmal success in court" with only one suit out of 32
adjudicated cases having obtained a judgment for the plaintiff. A similar result is reported by
Jones, Resolution of Shareholder Lawsuits, supra note 9, at 543, 545: This author followed 531
derivative and class action suits brought against the corporate officials of 205 publicly held
corporations between 1971 and 1978. In his sample of cases, of the 88 suits which were decided
by the court in some manner, plaintiffs prevailed in only two (i.e., 2.3 percent).
72. See ALl, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 6, at 589; Coffee,
Understandingthe Plaintifs Attorney, supra note 9, at 677-83; Alexander, supra note 69, at 53435.
73. ALl, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 6, at 589; Alexander, supra
note 69, at 534-45. A further conclusion that might be drawn from these and other studies is that
"stock volatility, more than fraud, produces securities litigation" - i.e., that a sharp decline of the
stock value resulting in high trading losses for shareholders regularly predicts securities litigation.
Coffee, New Learning, supranote 69, at text accompanying note 10. For example, in Alexander's
study,.every initial public offering with a market loss over $20 million resulted in suit, but none
of those issuers whose IPO was for less than $20 million was sued. See Alexander, supra note
69, at 511-12. Similarly, the study of O'Brien and Hodges, containing data on 332 class action
securities cases between April 1988 and June 1991, reports a steep drop in the defendants' stock
price - averaging more than 50 percent - that preceded the filing of most suits. See VINCENT
E. O'B~iEN & RicHARD W. HODGES, A STUDY OF CLASS ACTION SECURITIES FRAUD CASES, at
11-3 (1991).
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period and the settlement period. Therefore, the following subparts will
analyze both of these stages of shareholder litigation. First, the factors
that create incentives for abuse will be looked upon more closely.
Then, potential solutions to this problem will be discussed not only by
analyzing the various means offered by existing legal rules to remedy
the situation, but also by discussing some reforms that may be useful in
this respect.
B. PretrialStage
1. Incentives for Abuse: Notice Pleading and Discovery.-In the
pretrial period, it is usually the combination of modem American civil
procedure's generous pleading requirements and liberal discovery rules
which is blamed for creating incentives for filing nonmeritorious strike
suits.74 Under the notice pleading system, as implemented by Rule 8
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and similar rules of state law,
a mere "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief' is usually sufficient to file suit and gain access to
extensive pretrial discovery devices.75 The discovery devices placed
at plaintiffs disposal by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
respective state laws give the plaintiffs attorney the power to harass the
defendants with extensive depositions and discovery of business
documents that can severely disrupt the corporation's day-to-day
business. 6 Unscrupulous shareholder plaintiffs or their lawyers may
succumb to the temptation to exploit the nuisance value of these
discovery devices in order to force the defendant corporate officials to
by Justice
a settlement. These concerns were put in the following terms
77
Stores:
Drug
Manor
v.
Stamps
Chip
Blue
Rehnquist in
[The concern] is that in the field of federal securities laws
governing disclosure of information even a complaint which by
objective standards may have very little chance of success at trial
has a settlement value to the plaintiff out of any proportion to its
prospect of success at trial so long as he may prevent the suit from
being resolved against him by dismissal or summary judgment. The
very pendency of the lawsuit may frustrate or delay normal business
activity of the defendant which is totally unrelated to the

74.
75.
76.

See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-41 (1975).
FED. R. Ov. P. 8(a)(2).
See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 741.

77. In the majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist discusses particularly the merits and dangers
of class actions under Rule 1Ob-5. However, his considerations are equally valid for derivative
suits.
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lawsuit ....

The potential for possible abuse of the liberal

discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may
likewise exist in this type of case to a greater extent than they do
in other litigation. The prospect of extensive deposition of the
defendant's officers and associates and the concomitant opportunity
for extensive discovery of business documents, -is a common
occurrence in this and similar types of litigation.7"
Because of the differences between plaintiffs' and defendants'
strategic positions in shareholder derivative and class action litigation,
the litigation costs created by the use of pretrial discovery may be
significantly higher for the defendant corporate officials than for the
plaintiff shareholders.79 Contrary to other fields of civil litigation,
securities class actions and derivative suits are often one-sided disputes
so that plaintiffs and their lawyers control the discovery agenda.80
Accordingly, defendants must respond to every discovery request by the
plaintiff (unless they succeed in convincing the court that it is
improper), while it is left to the plaintiff to decide whether, when, and
how to review defendants' responses. 81 It is also usually less
expensive to present discovery requests, especially document requests
and interrogatories, than to respond to them.82 These factors can
render the pretrial discovery stage so much more cumbersome and
expensive for the defendants than for plaintiff that defendants may be
induced to settle the case rather than going to trial even though they
might have a significant chance of winning on the merits.83
2. ProceduralDevices to Restrict Abuse.-As discussed above, the
two characteristics of the pretrial stage of American civil procedure
which are apparently responsible for creating incentives for shareholder
strike suits are the low pleading requirements and the far-reaching
discovery devices. Consequently, any attempt to remedy this problem
must focus on these two aspects. As the following analysis will show,
however, many jurisdictions already utilize various procedural rules or
devices that are meant to deter frivolous suits and/or to restrict the
abuse of pretrial discovery. The following subsections will discuss
these procedural devices and analyze their effectiveness.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 740-41.
Alexander, supra note 69, at 548-49.
Id. at 549.
Id.
Id. at 548.
See id. at 548-49.
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(a) Means to deter frivolous suits
(1) Derivative suits: contemporaneous ownership rule and
security-for-expenses statutes.-Two important procedural requirements,
applicable only to derivative suits, are the judge-made contemporaneous
ownership rule and the security-for-expenses statutes.84
The
contemporaneous ownership rule, as it exists in the majority of
jurisdictions, requires either that the derivative suit plaintiff was a
shareholder at the time of the transaction which is the subject of the
complaint or that the plaintiff thereafter obtained the shares by operation
of law.85 Security-for-expenses statutes, which exist in about one third
of the states, 8 6 give corporate defendants the right to demand that the
shareholder plaintiffS7 post security for the payment of defendants'
reasonable litigation expenses before filing suit. 8
The problem with both requirements is that they are not related to
the merits of the individual case and, therefore, tend to affect
meritorious and nonmeritorious suits evenly. Further, courts and
legislatures have permitted more and more exceptions to these
requirements. 9 Additionally, the security-for-expenses statutes have
not proven very effective in discouraging strike suits because plaintiffs
can often avoid the security requirements by casting their claims in
terms of a federal securities law violation and going to federal court.9"
(2) Derivative suits: demand-on-the-board requirement
(i) The present law.-Another procedural hurdle that is
applicable only to derivative suits, and which must be overcome by the
plaintiff even before the pleading stage, is the demand-on-the-board
requirement.
This requirement has its origin in the traditional

84. These requirements originated at least partly out of the concern of the state courts and
legislatures about frivolous shareholder actions. CLARK, supra note 8, at 651, 654.
85. Id. at 650. For an extensive list of the statutory rules imposing this requirement, see ALI,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 6, at 638-40.

86. For a list of these state statutes, see ALl, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra
note 6, at 682.
87. Some state laws impose this burden only on small derivative suit plaintiffs. See, e.g.,
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 627.
88. CLARK, supra note 8, at 652. For the history of these statutes, see id. at 653-55.
89. An important exception to the contemporaneous ownership rule is, for example, the
"continuing-wrong doctrine," according to which the plaintiff does not run afoul of the
contemporaneous ownership rule if the alleged misconduct is construed by the court as having
"continued" until plaintiff bought her shares. CLARK, supra note 8, at 651.
90. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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conception of the derivative action as two suits in one. 9' Originally,
the shareholder plaintiff first had to bring a suit in equity against the
corporation seeking an order compelling it to bring suit against a third
person who had caused injury to the corporation.92 This third person
was frequently, but not always, an officer or director of the
corporation. 93 Although the derivative suit is treated as a single action
today, this procedural origin still raises the important question of who
should have the control over the suit - the corporation on whose
behalf the action is brought or the shareholder plaintiff.
In most states, this problem has resulted in the imposition of a
requirement that the shareholder plaintiff must exhaust any available
intracorporate remedy before being allowed to file a derivative suit.94
Accordingly, state laws usually require the shareholder to demand
action from the corporation's directors to redress the alleged wrong
committed against the corporation before bringing a derivative suit in
the name of the corporation against the malfeasor. 95 Usually, the
shareholder is permitted to sue without a prior demand on the board
only if such a demand would be futile because the alleged wrongdoers
control the majority of the board. 96 The directors can respond to the
shareholder request either by taking corrective action or by rejecting the
demand. In the case of a rejection, most state courts generally do not
allow a judicial review of the merits of the board's decision. 97 Rather,
91. CLARK, supra note 8, at 639.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See id. at 640.
95. Id.
96. CLARK, supra note 8, at 640-41.
97. The courts of New York and Delaware, the most important state jurisdictions in this
respect, use different tests as to the scope of judicial review of the committee's decision to reject
the demand. The New York Court of Appeals explained in Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994
(N.Y. 1979) that the committee's decision would be reviewed only if plaintiff could show that the
committee members were not truly independent or disinterested in making their decision, that they
did not act in good faith, or that their investigation was not sufficiently diligent. Id. at 1001-03.
Otherwise the committee's decision is protected by the business judgment rule. Id. at 1001.
The Delaware Supreme Court, on the other hand, distinguishes between "demand excused"
and "demand required" situations. Under Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984), the test
for demand futility is basically the same as the above-stated New York test. In Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 1981), the court held that where a demand on directors is
excused, a court may exercise its own "independent business judgment" to determine whether the
litigation should be dismissed. But Aronson v. Lewis holds that where demand is required, the
decision whether or not to pursue the litigation is .vested in the board of directors and their
decision is controlled by the business judgment rule. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812-14. Most
Delaware cases have concluded that demand was required and that, therefore, the business
judgment rule was applicable to the independent litigation committee's determination to
discontinue the litigation. See, e.g., Aronson, 473 A.2d at 818; Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180
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they generally permit a derivative action to proceed only if the
shareholder can cast sufficient doubt on the soundness of the board's
decision-making procedure by showing either that the directors lacked
the necessary independence or good faith when rejecting the demand or
that their investigation in the disputed matter was insufficient.98
Particularly since the mid-1970s, the demand requirement has
become a rather powerful weapon for board members against
shareholder derivative suits because of the appearance of "litigation
committees" consisting of supposedly disinterested directors appointed
by the board to investigate the plaintiffs claims and recommend action
with respect thereto. 99
Commentators have reported that these
committees have almost invariably recommended dismissal of the
derivative action.' 0 Since the courts generally permit only a limited
review of the independent committee's decision-making process, l
the demand requirement has often made it difficult for shareholders to
wrest control over the derivative suit from the hands of the
corporation's directors.
In addition to the main purpose of determining who should control
the derivative suit, the deterrence of strike suits is also often given as
a rationale for the demand requirement.' 02 But it is far from clear to
what extent the demand requirement in its present form is actually
helpful in detecting and deterring frivolous shareholder suits.0 3 Since
the demand requirement steps in even before the litigation has reached
the pretrial stage, it does create disincentives for unscrupulous
shareholder plaintiffs to bring nonmeritorious nuisance actions. But,
unfortunately, it appears to deter, rather indiscriminately, both
meritorious and frivolous shareholder suits since the conditions for
judicial review of the board or litigation committee's decision to reject
the shareholder demand are not related to the merits of the underlying
case.

(Del. 1988). Thus, it appears that the Delaware courts are willing to defer to a larger extent to the
committee's decision to reject the demand than the New York courts.
98. CLARK, supra note 8, at 644.
99. See generally James D. Cox, Searchingfor the Corporation'sVoice in Derivative Suit
Litigation: A Critique of Zapata and the ALl Project, 1982 DUKE L.J. 959.
100. Id. at 960. With respect to this observation the Second Circuit has cynically noted: "If
the involved directors expected any result other than a recommendation of termination at least as
to them, they would probably never establish the committee." Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 888
(2d Cir. 1982).
101. See supra note 97.
102. CLARK, supra note 8, at 641.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 650.
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(ii) Proposalsfor reform.-Recently, various authorities have
suggested reform proposals in order to change the demand-on-the-board
requirement. The question is whether these proposals promise to be
more successful in resolving the problem of frivolous shareholder
litigation in the field of derivative suits.
One such proposal is a draft by the Business Council of New York
State which was introduced in the New York State Legislature in
1993.105 It largely follows the American Bar Association's Revised
Model Business Corporation Act" 6 which is already the basis for
derivative suit legislation in Florida, Georgia, Michigan, Montana, and
Wisconsin."7
According to the Business Council's draft, the
shareholder who intends to bring a derivative proceeding must make a
prior written demand on the corporation without exception in all
cases.'
The scope of judicial review of the board's or the litigation
committee's decision to reject the demand is restricted in a similar way
as under New York case law - the shareholder plaintiff may not
proceed with the derivative suit if the court concludes that the board's
or committee's decision was reached by a majority vote of independent
directors who, after being adequately informed, determined in good
faith that maintenance of the proceeding would not be in the best
interests of the corporation. "9
This standard of judicial review suffers from the same lack of
focus on the merits of the derivative suit as the present New York case
law. Further, a startlingly generous "safe harbour rule" has been
proposed in this draft for the determination of the directors'
independence: Neither the naming of the director as a defendant in the
derivative proceeding, nor the director's approval of the act being
challenged in the derivative suit shall suffice to consider that person as
not being independent unless the act resulted in personal benefit to the
director."0 These two characteristics of the New York draft proposal
would consequently enable a board or committee which is not really
disinterested in the matter to dismiss a derivative proceeding without its

105. See S. 1018, 215th General Assembly, 1st Sess. (N.Y. 1993). For the background of this
proposal, which is intended to cut back severely on shareholder derivative actions against New
York based corporations, see Franklin, supra note 6.
106. See REViSED MODEL BusINEss CORP. ACT §§ 7.40-7.47 (1984).
107. Franklin, supra note 6, at 5.
108. S. 1018, supra note 105.
109. Id.
110. The draft proposal also introduces a fee-shifting mechanism and restrictions on the
plaintiff's access to pretrial discovery, both of which shall be discussed infra, at note 139 and the
text accompanying notes 123-28.
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decision being reviewed by a court on its merits, as long as it follows
the formalities of the decision-making process prescribed in the draft
proposal. For this reason, the value of the proposed New York
legislation for solving the problem of abusive derivative litigation by
means of the demand-on-the-board requirement appears to be very
minimal.
More promising in this respect is a second proposal known as the
ALl Principles of Corporate Governance."'
Like the New York
proposal, the ALl proposal calls for shareholder demand in all cases
where such demand is not futile," 2 but it goes to greater lengths in
defining the scope of judicial review over the board's or litigation
committee's decision to discontinue the derivative proceeding. If the
claim concerns wrongdoing by a director that would be reviewable only
under the standards of the business judgment rule as defined by the ALl
Principles, the court could also review the board's or committee's
determination only under the business judgment rule." 3 A somewhat
stricter review of the board or committee's inquiry and of the
reasonableness of their decision is called for in all cases of an asserted
self-dealing and of a knowing violation of the law, i.e., where the
business judgment rule would not be applicable.'
Finally, in an
important number of cases where the plaintiff has established that the
defendant has retained a significant improper benefit,"' the derivative
suit shall not be dismissed at all unless the likely injury to the
corporation from the continuation of the action would clearly outweigh
any adverse impact on the public interest from the dismissal of the
action. "'6

111. See ALl, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 6, at 725-66.
112. Id. at § 7.03.
113. This rule applies to alleged violations of the duty of care, other than by a knowing and
culpable violation of the law, and certain cases of asserted self-dealing (compensation, etc.) where
the attacked transaction had been approved in advance by disinterested directors. See id. at §
1.10(a)(1), §§ 5.03-5.06, and § 6.02. The standard for the business judgment rule proposed by the
ALl is that the decision has been made in good faith by someone not interested in the subject
matter, who is informed to the extent he reasonably believes to be appropriate under the
circumstances, and who rationally believes that the decision taken is in the best interests of the
corporation. Id. at 180-82.
114. Here, the court may determine for itself whether the board or committee was adequately
informed and whether it reasonably determined that the dismissal would be in the best interests
of the corporation, based on grounds the court deems to warrant reliance. Id. at 180-82.
115. These are cases where the defendant also possesses control of the corporation, or where
the improper benefit was obtained without advance authorization or as the result of a knowing and
material misrepresentation or of another fraudulent act. Id. at 726-27.
116. Id.
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The ALI proposal does not directly relate the scope of judicial
review of the board's or committee's decision to dismiss the suit to the
potential merits of the case, but it at least distinguishes between
different kinds of claims and allows a stricter or even a full judicial
review in those cases which, according to its own standard, represent a
more severe wrongdoing than others, such as cases of improper selfdealing by a corporate official. Under the ALl proposal, therefore, the
demand requirement promises to serve as a somewhat more useful
screening device for detecting nonmeritorious derivative suits than
under the existing case law.
(3)
Special pleading requirements.-There are other
procedural rules that are intended to focus even more on the merits of
the case than those rules discussed thus far. These rules replace the
traditional rule of notice pleading with higher pleading standards for
specific kinds of shareholder actions, as will be discussed in the
following subparts.
(i) Pleading with regard to the demand-on-the-board
requirement.-As explained below, special pleading requirements are
imposed on all shareholder derivative actions by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23.1 and similar provisions in many other jurisdictions.
These provisions are interrelated with the above-mentioned demand-onthe-board requirement as imposed by state law. For example, according
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1, plaintiffs must show that they
have fulfilled the demand requirement by alleging "with particularity
the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff
desires from the directors ...and the reasons for the plaintiff's failure
to obtain the action or for not making the effort.""' Under Rule 23.1,
the federal courts do not simply accept conclusory allegations that the
other directors were controlled by the wrongdoing directors; rather, they
require plaintiffs who claim futility of a prior demand on the board to
plead specific facts showing domination or control to support their
claims." 8 Often, the federal courts apply the same strict pleading

117. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1. In general, courts seem to interpret the pleading requirements of
Rule 23.1 more strictly than the similarly worded Rule 9(b). Note, Discovery In Federal DemandRefused Derivative Litigation, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1025, 1028, 1030 (1992) [hereinafter Discovery
in FederalDemand-Refused Derivative Litigation].
118. Discovery In Federal Demand-Refused Derivative Litigation, supra note 117, at 1027.
See, e.g., Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., 939 F.2d 458, 460-61 (7th Cir. 1991); In re Kaufmann
Mutual Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 265 (Ist Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973); Jones
v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 409 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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standard to shareholders' claims of a wrongful refusal by the board." 9
Failure of the plaintiff to satisfy these special pleading requirements will
result in dismissal of the suit. 2 °
This special pleading requirement is usually evaluated at the
pleading stage, before the plaintiff has the benefit of the discovery
devices.' 2 ' Therefore, it often imposes a particularly heavy burden on
plaintiffs because they must come forward with details about the
internal corporate decision-making on the question of whether or not to
sue the wrongdoer, without having had any access to discovery yet.
Consequently, Rule 23.1 creates a high procedural hurdle for the
shareholder plaintiff far before the litigation reaches the issue of the
corporate officials' actual wrongdoing. For this reason, the pleading
requirement in Rule 23.1 has the same effect as the demand requirement
as such - it tends to bar derivative suits without regard to the real
Therefore, it cannot be considered a useful
merits of the case. 2
device for solving the problem of frivolous shareholder litigation.
The same criticism is true for the special pleading requirement as
contained in the 1993 draft proposal for New York. 23 According to
that proposal, a shareholder who commences a derivative proceeding
after the board or a litigation committee has rejected the shareholder's
demand to take suitable action must allege in the complaint particular
facts which would establish that the board or committee was not
adequately informed or did not act in good faith when it dismissed the
demand. 124 The corporation may then react to the complaint in two
different ways. First, it may file a motion to dismiss the complaint for
failure to state with particularity the above-mentioned facts. 25 In that
case, the plaintiff shall not be entitled to any disclosure or discovery
prior to the court's denial of such motion. 26 Second, the corporation
may move for summary judgment on the grounds that the board or
committee was in fact adequately informed and decided in good faith
that maintenance of the derivative proceeding would not be in the best

119. Discovery In Federal Demand-Refused Derivative Litigation, supra note 117, at 1028.
See, e.g., Lewis v. Hilton, 648 F. Supp. 725, 727 (N.D. III. 1986).
120. There appears to be disagreement among courts and commentators whether the dismissal
can be based directly on Rule 23.1 or whether this Rule has to be applied in conjunction with FED.
R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6). Discovery In FederalDemand-Refused Derivative Litigation, supra note 117,
at 1027 n.20.
121. LEwis D. SOLOMON ET AL., CORPORATIONS: LAW AND POLICY 852 (2d ed. 1988).
122. Discovery In Federal Demand-Refused Derivative Litigation, supra note 117, at 1028.
123. S. 1018, supra note 105.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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interests of the corporation.' 2 7 In that event, the plaintiff would be
entitled to disclosure or discovery with respect to the issues presented
by the motion only if the complaint fulfills the above-mentioned
requirements, and only to the extent that the court determines that such
disclosure or discovery is necessary and consistent with an expedited
resolution of the motion.' 28
With regard to the deterrence of strike suits, this part of the New
York proposal suffers from the same shortcoming as the pleading
requirements in Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It
blocks the plaintiff's access to discovery indiscriminately for
nonmeritorious and meritorious suits because it focuses only on the
plaintiff's pleading with respect to the validity of the board's decision
to dismiss the derivative proceeding and does not deal at all with the
merits of the underlying claim.
(ii) Pleading with regard to allegations offraud.-Another
special pleading requirement, however, appears to be more successful
in specifically deterring frivolous shareholder actions. Rule 9(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that "[i]n all averments of
fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall
be stated with particularity."' 2 9
In the context of shareholder
litigation, this pleading requirement acquires particular importance for
shareholder class actions or derivative suits that claim a violation of
federal securities anti-fraud rules due to fraudulent behavior by the
corporation's officials. 3 ° Rule 9(b) has the dual purpose of chilling
strike suits and of giving defendants who are accused of fraud fair
notice of the serious charges raised against them. 3 ' Failure of the
plaintiff to comply with the pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) renders
the pleading vulnerable to a motion by the defendant to dismiss for
failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 32
'
As to the impact of Rule 9(b) on shareholder litigation, a recent
study noted a threefold increase from 1990-91 to 1991-92 of dismissals
by federal courts of shareholder securities fraud complaints against

127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
S.1018, supra note 105.
FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
Edward M. Posner & Karl L. Prior, Motions to Dismiss Shareholders' Suits Against

Officers and Directors, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF

SHAREHOLDER LnGATION AGAINST DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS C735 ALI-ABA 91, 99 (1992).
131. Id. at 98-99.
132. THOMAS A. COYNE, FEDERAL RULES OF PROCEDURE 102 (Release #11, 11/1991).
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directors and officers based on Rule 9(b).'33 The authors of this study
state that "[t]he increased application of Rule 9(b) may stem from the
courts' thinning patience with nearly identical 'boiler-plate' securities
fraud complaints.' 13 4 According to the study, in this kind of action
"extensive quotations from annual reports and press releases precede the
averment of a 'surprising' or 'shocking' bit of bad news which sent the
stock price tumbling. That the defendants 'must' have known sooner
of the bad news is averred generally, then millions of dollars in
damages are demanded."' 35 The authors note that in many recent
dismissals based on Rule 9(b), the courts have been openly hostile to
such unfounded allegations. 36
'
Consequently, this pleading
requirement seems to become more and more important in the courts'
effort to prevent frivolous shareholder suits from reaching the trial
stage.
(4) Certification requirement.-Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure offers defendants another means to counter-attack
frivolous shareholder suits, whether in the form of derivative suits or
class actions.'" It requires that plaintiff's attorney certify by signing
under the suit filed that to the best of her knowledge, information, and
belief formed after reasonable inquiry the suit is well grounded in fact
and is not interposed for any improper purpose such as to harass.' 3 8
If a pleading is presented to the court in violation of these requirements,
Rule 11 gives the court the power to impose upon the attorney and/or
the plaintiff an appropriate sanction such as an order to pay the other
party's reasonable expenses incurred so far in the litigation.139

133. There were 17 cases reported by WESTLAW from May 1, 1990-April 30, 1991, and 51
reported cases for the same period in 1991-92. Posner & Prior, supra note 130, at notes 2 and 3.
134. Id. at 109.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See COYNE, supra note 132, Advisory Committee's Note - 1983, at 102 (Release #8,
2/1989). The 1983 amendment of Rule 11 along with that of Rules 7, 16, and 26 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure was the result of a decade-long debate in the 1970s about the abuse of
discovery. This debate followed the 1970 amendment which had dramatically liberalized pretrial
discovery by abolishing the original requirement of court approval prior to utilization of most
discovery devices. Margaret L. Weissbrod, Sanctions under Amended Rule 26 - Scalpel orMeatAx? The 1983 Amendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,46 01O ST. L.J. 183 (1985);
KENT SINCLAIR, SINCLAIR ON FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE 486-87 (3rd ed. 1992).
138. FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
139. A similar fee-shifting mechanism has been proposed in the draft introduced by the
Business Council of New York into the New York State Legislature. It provides that, on
termination of the derivative proceeding, the court may order the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney
to pay defendant's reasonable expenses (including counsel fees) incurred in defending the
proceeding if it finds that the proceeding was commenced or maintained without reasonable cause
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Prior to the 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, there was evidence that the certification requirement of Rule
11 was beginning to achieve its goal of deterring frivolous filings.
According to a study based to a large extent on interviews conducted
with judges and attorneys, one-third of the lawyers interviewed reported
that their pleading practices had changed because of Rule 11. 4 This
study further noted that Rule 11 enjoyed generally widespread support
among the bench and bar, particularly because of the benefit of
deterring frivolous suits, 4 ' although a substantial group of lawyers
interviewed expressed concern about the potentially chilling effects of
Rule 11 and the risk of its causing potentially cumbersome satellite
litigation on procedural issues.'42
However, the beneficial deterrent effect of Rule 11 has been
watered down somewhat by the amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure which became effective on December 1, 1993. Under
the new version of Rule 11, the petitioner is given twenty-one days to
withdraw a nonmeritorious filing without incurring any sanctions after
having been informed by the court that it may consider the pleading
frivolous. Thus, the petitioner is given the opportunity to fire a riskless
"free shot." Further, the amendment gives the courts discretion as to
whether to impose sanctions on the party filing a nonmeritorious suit,
whereas the prior rule made sanctions mandatory and only granted
courts discretion as to the type of sanction imposed. Notably, it was for
these very reasons that Justice Scalia severely criticized the 1993
changes in Rule 11 in his dissenting opinion to the Supreme Court's
approval of the amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
43
Procedure.
(5) Summary judgment.-A further important procedural
device which could be used to dispose of a nonmeritorious suit before
it reaches trial is the defendant's motion for summary judgment
pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or
corresponding state rules. Traditionally, however, summary judgment
or for an improper benefit. See S. 1018, supra note 105.
140. THOMAS E. WILLGING, THE RULE 11 SANCTIONING PROCESS 11 (Federal Judicial Center
1988).
141." Id. at 11-12.
142. Id. at 169-74. The results of this study were largely confirmed by another survey
reported in Gerald F. Hess, Rule 11 Practice in Federal and State Court: An Empirical,
Comparative Study, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 313 (1992).
143. See Amendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,61 U.S.L.W. at 4392-94 (April
27, 1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Thomas and Souter, JJ.); Linda S. Mullenix, Civil Rule
Revisions a Mixed Bag, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 23, 1993, at S14.
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was very difficult to obtain in shareholder litigation involving complex
issues of fact because the courts viewed summary judgment as a rather
drastic remedy that would prevent the claimant from presenting the
cause of action to the jury.'" The courts have held, therefore, that
summary judgment would usually be inappropriate for deciding
questions like the materiality of undisclosed information' 45 or whether
the defendants' state of mind fulfilled the scienter standard under Rule
1Ob-5.' 46 But, this trend may be changing now as a consequence of
the Supreme Court's 1986 summary judgment trilogy. 47 These three
Supreme Court decisions are generally perceived as making summary
judgment more readily available in factually complex cases 48 by
relaxing the burdens resting on the party moving for summary
judgment 49 and by allowing summary judgment even where state of
50
mind is at issue.
(b) Means to restrict abuse of pretrial discovery.-So far, the
rules discussed have only addressed the problem of frivolous suits from
the angle of how to prevent the filing of a nonmeritorious action.
However, the 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
also brought procedural reforms that were specifically designed to
restrict the abuse of pretrial discovery by the repetitive and excessive
use of the discovery devices for mere harassment purposes. Most
important in this respect were the changes in Rule 26 that abrogated the
former principle that utilization of the various discovery methods was
not limited.' 5 ' A new paragraph was added to Rule 26, providing that
the court shall limit the use of discovery if it is duplicative of other
sources of information, more burdensome than other means to
illuminate the same issue, more expensive, sought after a full prior
opportunity to obtain the same information, or simply not important

144. See William M. Lafferty & W. Leighton Lord II, Towards A Relaxed Summary Judgment
Standard For The Delaware Court of Chancery: A New Weapon Against Strike Suits, 15 DEL. J.

CORP. L. 921, 935 (1990).
145. See Caravan Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 769 F.2d 561,
565 (9th Cir. 1985).
146.

See Vucinich v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 739 F.2d 1434, 1436 (9th Cir.

1984).

147.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
148. Alexander, supra note 69, at 586. The Supreme Court stated in Celotex that summary
judgment is the principal tool for preventing factually insufficient claims or defenses from going
to trial.
149.
150.
151.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327.
See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
SINcLAIR, supra note 137, at 487.
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enough in light of the nature of the suit to warrant the burdens
entailed.' 52 The court may undertake this review of the discovery
proceedings either sua sponte, as part of its duty to manage the
litigation before it, or it may do so in response to a party's motion
challenging the propriety of a discovery request of the other party. 53
Contrary to the preceding rule, this broad provision imposed on the
court the central responsibility of assessing the merits and burdens of
the discovery contemplated by the parties.' 54
Another significant change in Rule 26 was the introduction of the
certification requirement which parallels the above-mentioned
amendment of Rule 1I."' Rule 26(g) requires the plaintiff, or
plaintiff's attorney, to certify at the filing of every discovery request or
response that the request or response is not interposed for any improper
purpose such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation, and that it is not unreasonably
burdensome or expensive given the needs of the case, the discovery
already had in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance
of the issues at stake.' 5 6 In the event of a detected violation of this
rule, the court has the power on its own initiative or upon motion by the
aggrieved party to impose "an appropriate sanction" on the
malfeasor - either -the plaintiff, the plaintiffs attorney, or both.' 57
One penalty expressly mentioned in the rule itself is reimbursement of
the costs and fees 158incurred by the opposing party because of the
sanctioned conduct.
Unfortunately, there exists no empirical data on the impact of the
1983 amendments to Rule 26. However, since the certification
requirement in Rule 26(g) closely parallels that of Rule 11, one may
expect that it will perhaps achieve a similar deterrent effect. Both
additions to Rule 26, however, were cast in relatively broad terms.
Therefore, both pose some risk that their application may very well
result in a significant amount of burdensome satellite litigation which
may offset the decrease in unnecessary discovery they were meant to
achieve.

152.
153.
154.

155.
156.
157.
158.

FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1).
Id.
SINCLAIR, supra note 137, at 489.
See supra notes 137-42 and accompanying text.
FED. R. CIv. P. 26(g).
Id.
Id.
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3. Evaluation.-The preceding analysis has shown that various
means are placed at the courts' or defendants' disposal to deter the
filing of frivolous suits and the abusive use of pretrial discovery. Those
devices which are specifically limited to the shareholder derivative suit
(i.e., the demand and corresponding pleading requirements,
contemporaneous ownership rules, and security-for-expenses statutes)
generally seem less effective since they tend to indiscriminately restrict
meritorious and nonmeritorious suits and have partly become
undermined by various exceptions. On the other hand, it seems that
some of the strong incentives to file nuisance actions caused by the
liberal American pleading and discovery rules may have diminished
during the course of the last decade as the consequence of several
important changes in the procedural law: the introduction in 1983 of
the Rule 11 and 26(g) certification requirements and of the courts'
power to prohibit overly burdensome discovery in Rule 26(b)(1), the
1993 amendment to Rule 11, the Supreme Court's summary judgment
trilogy, and the courts' increasing use of the pleading requirements of
Rule 9(b). Despite the existence of empirical data suggesting that some
of these rules have begun to achieve their deterrence goals, it is still
difficult to appreciate the extent to which these developments have
already affected shareholder litigation and whether they have really had
any significant impact on the occurrence of strike suits. Even the most
recent empirical studies on the phenomenon of frivolous shareholder
suits are based on case samples that are still too old to be able to fully
reflect the impact of these reforms. '59 Therefore, it still remains to be
seen how much of a deterrent effect these reforms will ultimately have
in the field of shareholder litigation and at what cost.
C. Settlement Stage
The results of several empirical studies suggest that the mechanics
of the settlement stage may be even more to blame for the phenomenon
of shareholder strike suits than those of the pretrial period. 60 As

159. The study of Alexander, supra note 69, is based on class actions that arose out of a group
of initial public offerings in the computer industry which all took place during the first six months
of 1983. Id. at 507. The study of Romano, Litigation without Foundation,supra note 5, consists
of a sample of suits brought from the late 1960s through 1987. Id. at 58. Considering the usual
delay that occurs between the courts and the bar becoming aware of a procedural reform and the
time they begin to use the new devices to the fullest possible extent, even the cases in these studies
that were filed after 1983 or 1986, respectively, most probably had not been affected yet by the
above-mentioned changes in the procedural law.
160. See, e.g., Alexander, supra, note 69; Romano, Litigation without Foundation,supra note
5; Jones, Resolution of Shareholder Lawsuits, supra note 9; Bryant G. Garth et al., Empirical
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noted above, some studies show that the settlement rate in shareholder
litigation appears to be very high, probably even higher than in other
civil suits, 6' whereas the number of cases adjudicated by final
judgment in favor of the plaintiff is extremely low.' 62 Among those
cases settled, a significant number did not confer any monetary relief
on the shareholder plaintiff, and resulted only in structural relief, such
as therapetutic changes in the corporation's structure or procedure. 163
Furthermore, in all settlements, the parties agreed on substantial fees for
the plaintiff's attorney," even in those cases where only structural
relief was provided.' 65
These results are most commonly explained on the hypothesis that
the procedural and substantive law in shareholder class actions and
derivative suits create, for most participants, very strong incentives to
settle instead of going to trial.' 66 There are various reasons why the
defendants in these types of suits would want to settle rather than seek
a favorable judgment for themselves, even though plaintiff's action
might be without merit.' 67 Adding this to the incentives already
created by the above-mentioned pretrial pleading and discovery rules,
plaintiffs or their attorneys may be induced to bring frivolous suits
merely for their nuisance and settlement value. On the other hand, the
plaintiff's attorney may also be tempted to settle a case before trial, in
spite of the merits of the case, because of conflicts between the
attorney's personal desire to garner high fees and the underlying goal
of maximizing recovery for the client. Either way, the result appears

Research and the Shareholder Derivative Suit: Toward a Better-Informed Debate, 48 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 137 (Summer 1985).
161. See supra note 69.
162. See supra note 71.
163. According to the study of Romano, Litigation without Foundation, supra note 5, at 61,
a little more than half of the settlements (46 out of 83) resulted in monetary relief. Twenty-one
settlements involved structural relief instead of a financial recovery. Id.at 61 n.10. In the study
of Jones, Resolution of Shareholder Lawsuits, supra note 9, which was partly reanalyzed by Garth,
supra note 159, at 146, of the 32 settlements that appear to be derivative, 22 resulted in cash relief,
and 10 involved no monetary relief.
164. In the study of Jones, Resolution of Shareholder Lawsuits, supra note 9, at 565-66, the
fees in settlements, accommodations, and judgments for monetary relief varied widely (from 4.3%
to 110% of the recovery), with the average being around 30%, and most ranging between 10% and
30%. In the study of Alexander, supra note 69, at 539, the court-awarded fees varied from 5.9%
to 30%, with most of them ranging between 25% and 30%.
165. For example, in the six settlements in the study of Jones, Resolution of Shareholder
Lawsuits, supra note 9, at 565-66, that resulted only in procedural changes, the plaintiff's attorney
fees ranged from $25,715 to $85,000.
166. Alexander, supra note 69, at 524, 528-57; cf. Al, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, supra note 6, at 589.
167. See infra notes 169-80 and accompanying text.
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to be that the settlement finally agreed upon by the parties probably
does not reflect the true merits of the case. This may then produce
even further incentives for plaintiffs' attorneys to file cases not so much
according to their
merits, but rather according to their potential
68
settlement value.

The following sections will analyze, first, the rules of procedural
and substantive law that are responsible for creating this situation and,
second, possible reforms of the law governing or at least influencing the
parties' actions during the settlement stage that may resolve these
problems.
1. Incentives to Settle Without Regard to the Merits of the Case
(a) Incentives for defendants.-As the following paragraphs will
show, there seem to be two main factors that cause the defendants in
shareholder derivative and class action litigation to consider settling the
suit as soon as possible, even if their side of the case presents the
stronger merits: the individual defendants' risk aversion, and the
restrictions on recovery under indemnification and insurance policies.
Usually, a public corporation experiences shareholder litigation in
the form of a class action or a derivative suit only on rare
occasions. 169 The individual defendant directors and officers tend not
to be experienced in dealing with the pressure imposed by, and the
problems involved in, shareholder litigation. Therefore, commentators
consider them to be so-called "one-shot players" - persons who focus
the planning of their negotiation and litigation strategy on the one suit
pending against them and not on the effects which their behavior might
have on potential future shareholder litigation. 7
One-shot players
tend to be risk averse: Their attention is generally focused on how to
avoid the potential liability in the pending suit and not on how to
discourage future litigation against them. 7 '
The individual

168. See Alexander, supra note 69, at 524; Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney,
supra note 9, at 718.
169. According to Romano, Litigation without Foundation, supra note 5, at 59, the frequency
of this type of litigation is one shareholder suit per corporation every 48 years. Similar results
were obtained by Thomas M. Jones, An Empirical Examination of the Incidence of Shareholder
Derivative and Class Action Lawsuits, 1971-1978, 60 B. U. L. REv. 306, 312-13 (1980). In his
sample, a firm was named as a defendant about once every 6.7 years. After the elimination of the
effects of multiple suits concerning the same corporate event, this means that a company was
involved in a disputed issue on average only once every 17.5 years. Id.
170. Alexander, supra note 69, at 534.
171. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 L. & Soc. REv. 95, 100 (1974).
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defendants' risk aversion is usually intensified by the large potential
damages for which they might be held liable, particularly in duty of
172
care cases and cases involving violations of federal securities law.
In these cases, the potential damages may greatly exceed available
insurance coverage and would wipe out the personal assets of even very
73
wealthy individuals. For these reasons, the individual defendants
in shareholder litigation generally appear to favor entering into a
settlement with the plaintiff rather than risking the consequences of an
adverse adjudication even though the merits of the plaintiffs case may
be weak.' 74
These incentives become amplified by the interplay of the legal
rules that govern the liability and the indemnification and insurance of
directors and officers. For example, as far as the scenario of the
derivative suit is concerned, many corporations have adopted by-laws,
concordant with statutory authorizations, that permit the indemnification
of directors and officers who are named as defendants in derivative suits
brought for the violation of the corporate officials' fiduciary duties.' 75
The directors and officers may be indemnified for amounts they pay for
the settlement of a derivative suit and for their legal expenses, including
attorney's fees. 176 These by-laws and statutory rules, however, do not

172. Alexander, supra note 69, at 531.
173. Unlike the individual defendants, the accountants, underwriters, and other financial
institutions involved in a securities transaction are so-called "repeat players" who may see their
long term interest in deterring possible plaintiffs from bringing federal securities claims against
them in the fiture. See Galanter, supra note 171, at 100. Therefore, they might prefer to go to
trial in order to obtain a favorable judgment instead of settling the case along with the individual
defendants. In case of such a partial settlement, difficult issues of contribution among the several
defendants may arise. See JENNINGS, supra note 56, at 192-94.
174. Coffee, Unfaithful Champion, supra note 6, at 19; Alexander, supra note 69, at 529-34.
However, a different interpretation of the directors' and officers' litigation strategy appears quite
plausible too: The true reason for the high number of settlements and the rare occurrence of final
adjudications favorable to the shareholder plaintiffs may perhaps be the sophistication of the
defendant directors and officers and their attorneys. It may be that in reality they succeed in
settling most cases that appear dangerous from their perspective before they reach the trial stage.
Then, the only cases that go to trial are those where the plaintiffs' chances of winning are low.
According to this hypothesis, the defendants' litigation behavior would consequently appear to be
rational and correct. But then there would appear to exist even stronger evidence for the existence
of conflicts of interest for plaintiffs' attorneys in the shape of incentives to settle cases prematurely
despite their merits for their clients' side. Therefore, if this analysis were correct, any suggestions
for the reform of the settlement stage would then have to focus only on the plaintiffs' attorneys'
litigation behavior.
175. The situation is very similar in the context of shareholder class actions that are based on
the alleged violation of federal securities law by the corporation officials. See Alexander, supra
note 69, at 550-56.
176. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 722(c) (McKinney Supp. 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 145(b) (1983) (permitting indemnification only for legal expenses, not for amounts paid in
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allow indemnification of the defendants if they have
been adjudicated
77
by a final judgment to be liable to the corporation.
Further, virtually all corporations listed on a national security
exchange have contracted for directors' and officers' liability ("D&O")
insurance to cover liabilities and legal expenses of their officers and
directors.' 7 8 The coverage of D&O insurance is often restricted in a
similar way as indemnification, either by statutory law or by the
provisions of the respective insurance contract. Like indemnification,
D&O insurance usually does not cover any damage payments made or
legal expenses incurred by the defendants if a final adjudication has
established that they have acted fraudulently or have engaged in unfair
179
self-dealing.

Consequently, indemnification and insurance are available to the
defendant directors and officers only to fund a settlement, but not to pay
for an adverse judgment. This means that the individual defendants can
settle the case with other people's money (that of the shareholders and
the insurer), but will have to pay for any unfavorable judgment and all
related legal expenses themselves. This creates powerful incentives for
the defendant officers and directors to settle a shareholder suit at no
monetary cost to them rather than to go to trial and risk a high personal
liability. 8 ' An unscrupulous plaintiff or plaintiffs attorney might be
tempted to exploit this behavioral pattern by filing a frivolous suit that
seems to threaten high monetary liability in order to force defendants
to settle.

settlement).
177. See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 722(c) (McKinney Supp. 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 145(b) (1983).
178. Alexander, supra note 69, at 550.
179. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 726(b)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1990). However, DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (1983) allows the corporation to purchase insurance on behalf of its
directors and officers against any liability incurred by them in this capacity, even for situations
where the corporations would not have the power to indemnify them according to § 145(b). But
typically the D&O policies themselves contain exclusions for active and deliberate dishonesty and
improper personal benefit. Alexander, supra note 69, at 552.
180. Coffee, Understanding the Plainti'sAttorney, supra note 9, at 715; Alexander, supra
note 69, at 550, 556. In fact, one might expect that at least the insurance companies who sell
D&O insurance act as "repeat players," i.e., that they shape their strategy according to their long
term economic interests in decreasing the number of cases in which they have to pay enormous
sums of money in order to fund the settlements ir shareholder litigation. Therefore, one might
expect them to exert pressure on the insured directors and officers during shareholder litigation in
order to keep them from settling prematurely at the insurance company's expense. This is
especially true since these expenses have become so high that they can only be recouped by means
of enormous insurance premiums which limit the availability, as well as the marketability, of D&O
insurance. But, apparently, the D&O insurance companies do not act in this way yet.
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(b) Incentives for plaintiff's lawyer.-There are equally strong
incentives to settle on the plaintiff's side. Here, however, the attention
of most commentators focuses on the plaintiff's attorney instead of on
the plaintiff personally.""' In the context of shareholder derivative
suits and class actions that concern publicly held corporations, it is in
reality usually the lawyer rather than the client who makes the
important litigation decisions about whether to settle and for how
much.' 82 The actual shareholder client often has, at best, a nominal
economic stake in the outcome of the litigation.'
Therefore,
shareholders often lack sufficient economic interest to pay the
information costs and expend the energy required to keep abreast of the
progress of the litigation and to make informed decisions.8 4 This
creates the danger of a substantial conflict of interest between the
lawyer and the client. The lawyer has a different economic interest in
the suit (i.e., the expected fee) than his clients who look for
compensation for their injuries. Their interests may conflict since the
fee award comes out of the damage recovery so that any increase in the
fee award necessarily leads to a decrease in plaintiffs' recovery. 8 5
This conflict of interest may lead lawyers in derivative suits or class
actions to enter into settlement agreements with the defendant directors
and officers before the suits reach trial, even though they might have
had a realistic chance of obtaining favorable judgments for their
clients.' 86
Many commentators blame the predominant fee award system in
derivative and class actions for causing this conflict of interest and for
amplifying the incentives for plaintiff's lawyer to bring weak cases.' 87
The award of attorneys' fees in derivative suits and securities class
actions is governed by the principles of the common fund doctrine and

181. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 69; Coffee, Understandingthe PlaintifsAttorney, supra
note 9.
182. Alexander, supra note 69, at 534-35.
183. See Coffee, Understandingthe Plaintifs Attorney, supra note 9, at 677-78; Alexander,
supra note 69, at 535.
184. Alexander, supra note 69, at 534-35. The American legal system relies to a large extent
on the concept of the plaintiff's attorney as an entrepreneurial "private attorney general" to
perform the function of deterring undesirable conduct. This has the advantage of enabling clients
who are dispersed or have only a comparatively small economical stake in the outcome to receive
legal representation without incurring the high costs associated with the coordination of the
enforcement of their rights. Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney, supra note 9, at 67879. But, it also poses severe problems as the analysis in the text shows.
185. Alexander, supra note 69, at 535-36.
186. Id.
187. See, e.g., Coffee, Understanding the Plaintifs Attorney, supra note 9, at 717-18;

Alexander, supra note 69, at 536-45.
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of the contingent fee. 8 " Under these principles, an attorney who
recovers a common fund for his client, either by judgment or by
settlement, is entitled to a reasonable fee from the fund, while an
attorney who does not achieve a recovery receives nothing.' 89
Because of this contingent character of the fee award, plaintiff's
attorney, in deciding whether to accept a settlement offer with a
virtually guaranteed fee or whether to go to trial, must weigh the
possibility of obtaining a higher fee award after trial against that of
obtaining no fee at all in case of a verdict in favor of the defendant.
This factor alone creates an incentive for the attorney to settle and to
receive a fee rather than risking an adverse outcome of the trial.' 9 °
The attorney's fees are most commonly determined in accordance
with the lodestar method. ' g
This method starts out with the
"lodestar" amount which represents the number of hours expended by
plaintiff's attorney that reasonably contributed to the fund, multiplied
by a reasonable hourly fee.' 92 The lodestar figure is then increased
or decreased by a multiplier that may reflect, depending on the court,
the contingent nature of the litigation, its complexity, or the quality of
the lawyer's performance.' 93 By placing the primary emphasis on the
number of hours worked and decoupling the lawyer's economic stake
from the size of his client's recovery, the lodestar method creates an
incentive for plaintiff's attorney to continue to work, even when the
additional fees incurred exceed the additional returns from the work
input.' 9' Because the fee award comes out of the plaintiffs' recovery,
there is a risk that attorneys will increase their fees at their clients'
expense.' 95
However, the incentive to pile up additional hours of work in order
to increase the fee award holds true only up to the point of trial. First
of all, plaintiff's attorney can be sure to receive a fee award only in the
case of settlement, but risks getting no fee at all if the case goes to trial

188.
189.

See generally Alexander, supra note 69, at 536-37.
Id. For details, see Monique Lapointe, Attorney's Fees in Common Fund Actions, 59

L. REv. 843, 844-45 (1991).
190. Alexander, supra note 69, at 537.
191. Lapointe, supra note 189, at 845. Originally, attorneys in common fund cases such as
class actions received a fixed percentage of the recovery. Id. The percentage method fell' into
disgrace during the 1970s, however, because of its apparent tendency to create excessive windfall
fee awards for lawyers. Id. The Third Circuit responded by adopting the lodestar method and the
other circuits soon followed suit. Id.
192. Id. at 846.
193. Id. at 84647.
194. Id. at 848.
195. Id.; Alexander, supra note 69, at 53840.
FORDHAM
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and the plaintiff loses. 196 Secondly, trial work will generally be more
stressful and time-consuming for plaintiff's lawyer than pretrial work
since the attorney usually has less control over the trial process than
over pretrial discovery.' 9 7 Both factors may cause plaintiff's attorney
to increase the number of working hours only up to the eve of trial and
to settle, if possible, at that very point. 9 8
The effect of all of this is in fact to decouple the fee award from
the merits of the case. This, in turn, creates a system of constructive
collusion between defendant's counsel and plaintiffs attorney.
Defendants are interested in a low settlement offer. Plaintiffs attorney,
in turn, has no real interest in increasing the recovery for his clients
because his fee is based on the hours billed and not on the size of the
Therefore, the fee award and the settlement size are
recovery.
structurally linked in such a way that plaintiffs attorney will not object
to defendants' offer of a low or even nonpecuniary settlement, and
defendants will not mind plaintiff's attorney piling up chargeable
working hours because the attorney fees will usually be paid by
D&O insurance or by the corporation through
defendants'
indemnification.' 99 It appears very plausible, as one commentator
concludes, that ultimately this process of structural collusion and of
decoupling the fee award from the merits of the suit may cause
plaintiffs' attorneys to bring more and more weak cases since they have
less reasons to screen their cases in this respect."
2. Suggestions for Reform of the Settlement Stage.-In order to
diminish the incentives that are responsible for the behavior of
defendants and plaintiffs' attorneys during the settlement period, either
the procedural rules or the substantive law that governs their strategic
thinking may be changed. This section will analyze the merits of
various options of how to reform the applicable law in this respect.
(a) Increasedjudicial oversight over settlement negotiations.-At
first glance, a promising way to reduce the risk of collusive negotiations
between the parties appears to be to strengthen judicial oversight of the
settlement process. Judicial approval of the settlement in shareholder
class actions and derivative suits is already mandatory today 20' in

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

See Coffee, Unfaithful Champion, supra note 6, at 36; Alexander, supra note 69, at 543.
Alexander, supra note 69, at 543.
Id.
Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney, supra note 9, at 718.
Id.
See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 626(d) (McKinney Supp. 1990); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e);

98

DICKINsoN LAW REVIEW

SPRING 1994

order to prevent illicit settlements in which defendants bribe the
derivative or class action plaintiffs - at the expense of the other
shareholders - by a relatively modest private settlement in order to
escape the threat of full liability.202
But the judicial oversight of the settlement process has not proven
to be very effective thus far: Although ideally it might seem that a
sensible judge would not be willing to approve a settlement that
involves attorney fees appearing disproportionate to the recovery
obtained, the dynamics of the settlement process often cause the courts
to take a rather deferential attitude towards the settlement agreement
presented by the parties.2" 3 If the former adversaries join together and
approach the court with a settlement proposal that is not disputed by
anyone, the court regularly not only lacks any incentive to scrutinize the
agreement, but it also has little independent access to information about
the merits of the settlement. 20 4 Besides, it is generally difficult for a
court to force litigants who are willing to settle their case to try it
instead.20 5 Furthermore, the court may have incentives of its own to
close a perhaps difficult and tedious case in order to remove it from its
docket and to reduce its workload.20 6 Commentators consider these
factors to be responsible for the empirical evidence 20 7 demonstrating
that courts quite often approve settlements that involve only cosmetic
procedural relief for the shareholders but at the same time grant high
attorney fees.208
One possibility to improve the quality of court supervision would
be to separate the negotiations and the court's approval of the
shareholders' recovery from the awarding of plaintiffs attorney's fees.
This may help to abolish the structural collusion between defendants
and plaintiffs' attorneys that may stem from the linkage of negotiations
for the lawyer fees and the settlement amount. However, in this
author's opinion, the very same factors that inhibit the effectiveness of

FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

See CLARK, supra note 8, at 658-59.
Coffee, Unfaithful Champion, supra note 6, at 26.
Id. at 26-27.
Id. at 27.
Id.
See supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.

208. Coffee, Unfaithful Champion, supra note 6, at 26-33. Coffee, Understanding the
Plaintiffs Attorney, supra note 9, at 714 n.121. This author cites a case (Good v. Texaco, Inc.,

No. 84-7051 (Del. Ch. May 14, 1984)) in which the court approved an attorney fee of $700,000
together with a rather cosmetic nonpecuniary relief in spite of its acknowledgement that the
requested fee appeared "somewhat staggering," had aroused "a sense of shareholder outrage," and
might be seen by some as a "feemail." Coffee, Unfaithful Champion, supra note 6, at 30-31.
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the judicial oversight of the settlement process as it exists today will
equally affect a system of judicial control in which the settlement size
and attorney's fees are treated separately. If courts are able to give
seemingly rational reasons for the approval of a cosmetic nonpecuniary
settlement for plaintiffs accompanied by a very high attorney fee award,
they will most probably also be willing to accept mere cosmetic
recoveries separately in cases where there is nobody objecting to them.
The same appears to be true for the proposal to transfer the judicial
oversight of the settlement process and the final judicial approval to a
special master.2 0 9 There is no compelling reason to expect that a
special master will necessarily be better equipped to disentangle the
various conflicts of interests on both sides of the dispute or to correctly
appreciate the benefit and the amount of the work done by plaintiff's
attorney. Nor can one expect that the special masters will themselves
be free of those personal conflicts of interests to which judges
sometimes seem to be exposed. Maybe American judges are simply so
marked by the adversarial system governing American civil procedure
that they are not ready to exercise the inquisitorial function that goes
with controlling the fairness of a settlement agreement that is presented
to them by both parties.
Further, since shareholder plaintiffs in derivative suits or class
actions often have merely a minimal stake in the outcome of the
litigation, it is doubtful that they themselves will ever have sufficient
interest in carefully monitoring the proceedings and the result of the
settlement process, even if the negotiations for the recovery and fee
award are separated. Another reason why, in the case of a strict
separation of the settlement negotiations for the recovery and the
attorney fees, the shareholder plaintiffs may not have any incentives to
oppose an unjustifiably large fee award that is separately paid by the
defendants is that because of this separation, a reduction of the
proposed fee award will have no effect on the size of the settlement
fund.

210

Consequently, since oversight of the negotiations during the
settlement stage by the shareholder plaintiffs or by the court will
probably always be unsatisfactory, it may seem more promising to try
to realign the incentives of the plaintiff and the plaintiff's attorney by
a change of the fee award system.

209. Judges in some jurisdictions have appointed special masters to scrutinize applications for
attorneys' fees and recommend appropriate fee awards. Alexander, supra note 69, at 542.
210. ALI, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GovERNANcE, supra note 6, at 846.
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(b) Change of the fee award system.-Some of the problems of
the lodestar method have been discussed above. 2"
For these and
other reasons, 21 2 courts are returning more and more to the
percentage-of-the-recovery method. 2 3 This approach simply requires
judges to determine what portion of the fund reasonably compensates
the attorney's work.2t4 At first glance, this method appears to solve
the problems of conflict of interests and of collusive settlements by
giving the attorney an interest in maximizing the settlement fund while
at the same time eliminating the attraction of nonpecuniary settlements.
But, it appears more than doubtful that the percentage-of-the-recovery
formula will really help to realign the interests of plaintiffs and their
attorneys. One commentator has argued convincingly that this method
encourages the plaintiff's attorney to enter into cheap settlements as
soon as the suit has reached the point where, with further litigation, the
size of the settlement would grow more slowly than the amount of time
spent by the attorney on the case.2" 5 Further, under this approach, a

211. See infra notes 194-200 and accompanying text.
212. Another problem is that the lodestar method tends to make excessive demands upon
judicial time and resources without being necessarily effective. In its application, the court has
to review various questions. For example, it must decide whether the attorney spent a reasonable
amount of time on the case, a question that has already caused a proliferation of satellite litigation.
Further, the court must determine whether to use the attorney's normal billing rate or the one
prevailing in the local legal community. Finally, it has to decide what kind of multiplier to apply
and which factors to consider in the determination of the size of the multiplier. Potential factors
are, for example, the risk of success involved in the case and the complexity of the legal issues.
Coffee, Unfaithful Champion, supra note 6, at 38-40, n.1 10. After a detailed review of time
records and fee rates, courts often only make a few general remarks about the uncertainty of the
recovery and then award a contingency multiplier around 1.5 that usually more than cancels out
the time-consuming exercise in blue-penciling that preceded it. Alexander, supra note 69, at 579.
For even further problems linked with the lodestar method, see Lapointe, supra note 189, at 84861.
213. See, e.g., Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt v. Graulty, 886 F.2d 268, 272 (9th Cir. 1989);
Brown v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 838 F.2d 451, 455 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 822
(1988). Even more recently, an odd new settlement technique called the "claims made" settlement
has become popular in this respect. Under this approach, the attorney's fee is not based on a fixed
percentage of the actual recovery ultimately obtained by the attorney for the clients, but rather on
the estimated size of the clients' potential claims. For the problems created by this technique
which, in fact, "largely frustrates the ability of the percentage-of-the-recovery formula to align the
interests of attorney and client," see John C. Coffee, Claims Made Settlement: An Ethical Critique,
N.Y.L.J., July 15, 1993, at 5.
214. Lapointe, supra note 189, at 866.
215. Coffee, Unfaithful Champion, supra note 6, at 41-44. The author cites some empirical
evidence which, although somewhat unsatisfactorily, shows that lawyers working in the personal
injury field who are compensated on a percentage-of-the-recovery basis tend to accept premature
and inadequate settlements, often without conducting any discovery or adequately investigating
their clients' cases. Id. at note 117 and accompanying text. The dysfunctional incentives for
plaintiffs lawyer appear to be even more corroborated by the fact - cited by Coffee in a recent
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large recovery and thereby a large fee award may often be due more to
the number of class members than to the attorney's actual skill or
work.2" 6 Finally, this method may also result in disproportionate fees
where the plaintiff's attorney simply "piggybacks" the class action onto
an SEC indictment or civil enforcement action. In such instances, the
plaintiff's attorney only needs to duplicate the SEC efforts in order to
secure a settlement.2" 7
Therefore, the percentage-of-the-recovery
method also decouples the fee award from the merits of the case, with
the same long-term implications for the occurrence of collusive
settlements and strike suits.
One commentator suggests taking the percentage-of-the-recovery
method as the starting point but leaving the decision as to what
percentage to award to the discretion of the court."" The court's
discretion would be limited to a certain range (e.g., 15% to 33% of the
recovery), and the court would have to follow certain guidelines as to
which factors to consider for the determination of the fee size.21 9
This approach may in fact help create incentives for plaintiffs' lawyers
to maximize the recovery for their clients and to avoid bringing weak
cases because they would otherwise risk receiving only a minimal fee.
On the other hand, this method also imposes a very time-consuming
burden on the court and would probably create much unpredictability
and satellite litigation about the fee issue.22 Also, the court might
article -

that in securities litigation cases, attorney's fees tend to be in reality a declining

percentage of the recovery, tending to decline sharply on a percentage basis as soon as the
recovery goes above an amount of about $20 million. In case of settlements below $20 million,
the plaintiff's attorney's fees plus expenses equal 25 to 28 percent of the settlement fund, then
decline to 17 percent for settlement funds between $20 and $50 million, and decline further to 8
percent for settlement funds over $50 million. For this reason, plaintiffs' attorneys rationally have
even less incentives to risk defeat at trial in larger cases when they do not share proportionately
in the gains with their clients. Coffee, New Learning, supra note 69, at note 13 and accompanying
text.
216. Lapointe, supra note 189, at 869.
217. Id.
218. Coffee, Unfaithful Champion, supra note 6, at 46-47.
219. Id. Coffee suggests the following factors: ". .. . award a more generous percentage in
cases when the plaintiff has gone to trial and thus accepted the risk of an adverse decision ....
[A]ward a lower percentage when the plaintiffs action essentially piggybacked on a prior
enforcement proceeding brought by a governmental agency (such as .. . the SEC)." Id. at 47.
Similar hybrid approaches are already being applied by some courts; see Lapointe, supra note 189,
at 869-72.
220. See the similar criticism brought forward in Lapointe, supra note 189, at 870, with regard
to the hybrid approached used by some courts. In Coffee's more recent article, New Learning,

supra note 69, at text accompanying note 20, he suggests various other solutions for the attorney
fee problem which would attempt to realign the attorney's interests with those of his clients
without extensive court intervention. One of them would be to shift from a simple percentage-ofthe-recovery formula to an increasing percentage-of-the-recovery, e.g., to give plaintiff's attorney
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again be tempted to facilitate its task by following a potentially
collusive settlement proposal suggested by the two formerly opposing
parties.
Therefore, the fundamental question in this context always seems
to be whether the task of guarding the interests of the plaintiffs, who in
derivative suits and class actions often do not play an active role in the
proceeding, can be transferred in an effective way from the plaintiff's
attorney to the judge. Leaving the determination of the fee award to the
guided discretion of the judge, combined with a separation of the
negotiation and approval of the recovery and the attorney fee, may
perhaps be a first step despite the problems it will probably create. But
this still leaves two important problems unresolved: the incentives for
the defendant directors and officers to transfer their liability ultimately
to the shareholders by a settlement that is financed through D&O
insurance or for which they receive indemnification, and the fact that
the incentives for plaintiff's lawyer to bring strike suits appear to be
further increased by the potentially high damage awards with which the
directors and officers are threatened by the statutory rules governing
their liability.
(c) Change in the law governing indemnification and D&O
insurance.-As noted above, the existence of indemnification and D&O
insurance that pay for the directors' and officers' liability and legal
expenses arising out of settlements, but not for those resulting from
adverse judgments, creates strong incentives for the defendant directors
" ' This, in
and officers to avoid going to trial and to settle instead.22
turn, may ultimately encourage plaintiffs' attorneys to file
nonmeritorious suits for their mere nuisance and settlement value.
Therefore, it appears necessary to encourage the defendant directors and
officers to settle less and bring more cases to trial in order to increase
the risks for plaintiff's attorney. This could be done either by
abolishing altogether all indemnification and D&O insurance for the
directors' and officers' liability arising out of the violation of their
fiduciary duties or the violation of federal securities law, or by
extending indemnification and D&O insurance to cover the liability and
legal expenses for adverse judgments.

20 percent of the first $20 million recovery, 30 percent of the next $20 million, and 40 percent
of any excess, in order to create incentives for the lawyer to maximize the recovery for the
shareholder plaintiff. Id.
221. See supra notes 175-80 and accompanying text.
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Both solutions, however, would raise significant problems on a
practical and policy level.
Allowing indemnification and D&O
insurance to cover adverse judgments in derivative suits and shareholder
class actions would not be as unusual as it might seem at first. In fact,
state statutes already expressly permit the indemnification of directors
and officers for adverse judgments in all suits other than derivative
actions, as long as the defendant has acted in good faith and in a
manner he or she reasonably believed to be in (or at least not to be
opposed to) the best interest of the corporation.222 But, allowing to
the same extent the indemnification of adverse adjudications for the
violation of fiduciary duties and of federal securities law would
practically abolish all deterrent effect of these important duties that are
imposed on the corporation's management and board. In addition, even
though it might seem acceptable from a policy point of view to permit
shareholders to bind themselves to indemnify directors and officers in
duty of care cases involving merely negligent misbehavior, this
reasoning does not apply to duty of loyalty cases and to violations of
federal securities law. 223
There are public policy reasons for
enforcing these duties, even if the majority of shareholders agree in
advance to waive their claims: In the case of the federal securities law,
for example, there are interests that extend beyond the single
corporation into the national securities market which limit the
shareholders' power to release the directors and officers from any
related liability. 224 And as far as the duty of loyalty is concerned,
there are overriding concerns about protecting the interests of minority
shareholders against the abuse of corporate power, not only by the
corporate officials, but also by the controlling shareholders, that would
likely stand in the way of such an indemnification rule.
Consequently, since indemnification for adverse judgments seems
unsound, if not impossible, one might think of the possibility of at least
extending D&O insurance to cover adjudications which hold corporate
officials liable for violating their fiduciary duties or federal securities
law. But besides the fact that the above-mentioned policy reasons that
speak against extending indemnification also stand in the way of such

222. See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAw § 722(a) (McKinney Supp. 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 145(a) (1983). Contrary to derivative suits, shareholder class actions for the violation of
federal securities law are not specifically exempted from indemnification for adverse judgments
by these statutory rules. But, it is widely agreed upon by federal courts that indemnification for
adverse judgments for securities law violations would be against federal public policy. See
Alexander, supra note 69, at 555.
223. See Alexander, supra note 69, at 595.
224. Id.
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an extension of D&O insurance, it also seems hardly probable that the
insurance companies would be willing to take such an economically
risky step.
The alternative would be to abolish indemnification and D&O
insurance for settlements and adverse judgments completely, thereby
putting an end to the directors' and officers' opportunity to pass their
liability on to other money sources (namely, shareholders and insurers).
On one hand, this would probably limit defendants' incentives for
settlements. It may also help further the general goal of increasing the
deterrent effect of the fiduciary duties and the federal securities law.
On the other hand, this proposal may create over-deterrence. Taking
into consideration the very high liability that may result for directors
and officers from the violation of fiduciary duties and federal securities
law, many of them would probably refuse to serve if there were no
financial recourse.225 The abolition of indemnification and D&O
insurance for settlements and adverse judgments may therefore be a
practicable solution only if it is accompanied by a sensible limitation of
the directors' and officers' liability.
(d) Change in corporate officials' liability.-Limitations on the
duty of care liability of officers and directors have in fact been enacted
in the great majority of states since the late 1980s. Most have followed
Delaware's example which permits companies to limit or eliminate, by
charter amendment, the directors' duty of care liability except for
intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of the law.226 Another
approach, which has been adopted by the state of Virginia and has been
endorsed by the American Law Institute, does not abolish the directors'
negligence liability for duty of care violations completely, but limits it
to the higher of $100,000 or the individual's cash compensation
227
received from the corporation over the prior year.
The latter approach appears to be particularly well suited to deal
with the problem of shareholder strike suits. It directly addresses the

225. During the 1984-87 insurance crisis, there were several highly publicized reports of
directors resigning or refusing to serve when their companies lost their D&O insurance coverage.
Alexander, supra note 69, at 583. For the causes of this insurance crisis, see generally Roberta
Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis, 39 EMORY L.J. 1155,
1158 (1990) [hereinafter Romano, Corporate Governance].
226. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1983); see Romano, Corporate Governance, supra
note 225, at 1160.
227. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1 (1989). In the ALI's formulation, a director's or officer's
liability may be limited by a charter amendment to "an amount not less than such person's annual
compensation from the corporation." ALl, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note
6, at 871.
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commensurability problem, i.e., the fact that the board members, and
especially the outside directors, are under the threat of high personal
liability that may be completely out of proportion to the financial
benefits they derive from their board positions.22s It is particularly
this risk that appears to make them so risk-averse and, therefore, leads
them to accept a settlement with shareholder plaintiffs and plaintiffs'
attorneys even if the stronger arguments are on their side of the
29
2

case.

In this author's opinion, a similar limit ought to be imposed on the
corporate officials' negligence liability for the violations of federal
securities law - especially for violations of Sections 11 and 12 of the
Securities Act23 and Sections 10(b) and 14(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act.23' No limitation should be applicable, however, in
cases involving intentional misconduct or improper personal
benefit.232 Further, no limitation should be imposed on the corporate
officials' liability for duty of loyalty violations because these cases
involve, by definition, improper self-dealing.2 33
It is beyond the scope of this study to discuss all of the pros and
cons of a limitation of the directors' and officers' liability for the
violation of fiduciary duties or federal securities anti-fraud rules. But
at least with regard to the problem of shareholder strike suits, a
limitation of the individual defendants' liability in the way described
above appears to be well-advised. It should abolish many of the
incentives for both sides that ultimately lead to a situation where the
settlements are not related to the merits. By reducing the disparity
between the potential liability of the corporate officials and the
economic benefits they derive from the company, this reform should
reduce their risk aversion and their willingness to settle prematurely.
Thereby, it should ultimately decrease the plaintiff's attorney's
incentives to file frivolous actions for their mere settlement value. But,
in order not to completely destroy the deterrent function of the fiduciary
duties and of the federal disclosure and anti-fraud rules, the remaining
228. Romano, Corporate Governance, supra note 225, at 1161.
229. Alexander, supra note 69, at 531.
230. 15 U.S.C. § 77k and § 771 (1982).
231. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) and § 78n(a) (1982).
232. What is meant by improper personal benefit is that the corporate officials, in violating
their duties under federal securities law, acted only for personal monetary benefit rather than for
the benefit of the corporation. Here, the author follows the proposal made by Alexander, supra
note 69, at 591.
233. There, the potential monetary liability is - according to the prevailing case law generally restricted to mere restitution of the profits derived from the self-dealing transaction
anyhow. CARY & EIsENBERG, supra note 6, at 571-73.
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liability risk for the corporate officials should be neither indemnifiable
nor insurable.
IV. Conclusion
Shareholder derivative suits and class actions share similar
problems with respect to strike suits. These problems are attributable
to some extent to the pleading and discovery rules of American civil
procedure, and to a greater extent to the whole bundle of factors that
govern the parties' strategic behavior during the settlement stage. These
factors include the attorney fee award systems, the rules governing the
indemnification and insurance of directors and officers, and the high
personal liability of corporate officials for the violation of state law
fiduciary duties and for the violation of federal securities anti-fraud
laws.
Blaming only the derivative suit for the burdens caused by
frivolous and abusive shareholder litigation is inaccurate. An outright
abolishment of the derivative suit would be useless. A skillful plaintiff
or plaintiff's attorney may find various ways to attack the corporate
officials' alleged wrongdoing directly or indirectly by means of a direct
shareholder action.
Several recent changes and reforms of the procedural law,
particularly the 1983 amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, give rise to the hope that in the future the courts will be
more active and more successful in battling the abuse of pretrial
discovery in shareholder litigation for extortionate purposes. The 1993
New York reform proposal for a new regulation of the derivative suit,
on the other hand, does not promise to be successful in solving the
problem of abusive litigation because it indiscriminately restricts
meritorious and nonmeritorious shareholder actions.
A need for reform still exists with respect to the complex set of
substantive and procedural rules that influence the plaintiff's attorney's
and the defendants' strategic planning during the settlement period. Yet
neither an increase in judicial oversight over the settlement process nor
a change of the attorney fee award system either back to the percentageof-the-recovery method or to a hybrid approach look very promising.
Both may create too much satellite litigation and will presumably not
be effective overall. The more useful approach appears to be to place
reasonable limitations on the corporate officials' personal liability for
duty of care violations and for violations of federal securities anti-fraud
rules, accompanied by a complete prohibition of any indemnification
and insurance of their remaining liability.

